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I INTRODUCTION
Perceptions of inflation play a central role in macroeconomic analyses because they di-
rectly affect the decisions of individuals, organizations and states. The efficacy of mon-
etary policy is thought to depend more heavily on the perceived inflation rate than the
actual, calculated inflation rate (e.g. Bernanke, 2007 and Blanchard et al., 2010). There
is evidence, however, that the perceived rate is not necessarily consistent with the actual
rate, and sometimes can deviate by a large margin.1 Thus, it is important to understand
how consumers perceive inflation, and uncover any systematic biases in those percep-
tions.
In this paper, we conduct an experimental and behavioral analysis of misperceptions
and biases in perceived inflation. We use laboratory experiments to identify a specific,
yet important bias in the perception of inflation: Consumers tend to overweigh price
changes of frequently-purchased goods when forming economy-wide inflation percep-
tions. We refer to this phenomenon as the frequency bias in inflation perceptions. We
also uncover a correlation bias in perceived individual-good rates, wherein these rates
are perceived to be more similar than their true values.
The frequency bias generates testable predictions for field data. Items such as ‘food
at home’ and ‘gasoline’ are frequently purchased, and are the most visible and best pub-
licized components of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). But they constitute only 8.9%
and 3.7% of total aggregate expenditures, respectively, and therefore only a small frac-
tion of the aggregate inflation rate.2 Frequency-biased consumers will perceive overall
inflation rates that are biased toward the inflation rates of gasoline and food. Survey
evidence on inflation perceptions broadly supports this conclusion. For example, Jonung
(1981) finds that inflation perceptions of women are more biased than those of men,
and attributes this to their more frequent retail shopping experiences and high food in-
flation rates at the time.3 More recently, Del Giovane and Sabbatini (2008) document
that perceived inflation tends to be higher during periods in which prices of frequently
purchased goods (e.g. basic food products like milk and vegetables) experienced larger
increases. Jonung and Laidler (1988) show that perceptions are in general not rational,
1For example, it is well documented that perceived inflation dramatically increased during the Euro
changeoverin 2002, even though the actual rate was stable (Fluch and Stix, 2005).
2These expenditure shares are based on the average weight over 1980-2010 from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
3In a recent survey of Ohio consumers, Bryan and Venkatu (2001a) also find that women perceive higher
rates of recent-past inflation than men, even controlling for age, socioeconomic and educational differ-
ences.
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average perceptions of inflation are too high, and individual perceptions are strongly
correlated with demographic characteristics and socioeconomic status.4 In fact, macroe-
conomic policy makers often stress the importance of food prices “in determining the
wage demands of labor and the inflationary expectations of all consumers” (p.34, 1976
Economic Report of the President), suggesting some awareness of this bias. And it is
the overall inflation rate that individuals must use when making financial investment
and savings decisions, so a bias in perceptions of this rate should have real economic
consequences through distorted allocations of financial assets.
Without the control of all relevant variables that the laboratory affords, however, it is
difficult to provide anything more than suggestive evidence about such biases. For ex-
ample, Ranyard et al. (2008) point out that an apparent bias toward essential goods like
food and gasoline may arise because official CPI calculations use aggregate expenditure
shares, which are more heavily influenced by the larger purchases of high-income indi-
viduals. The median consumer’s basket of goods contains more of these essential items
than the CPI basket, so the median perception will appear to have a frequency bias.
Our laboratory experiment rules out this explanation by forcing all subjects to consume
the same basket. Field observations are further plagued by unobservable information
sets, changing quality of goods, and lack of incentives in surveys (Mishkin, 1981).5 In
contrast, all of these can be controlled and manipulated in the laboratory, allowing for
cleaner measurement of perceptions.
Our experiment centers around a simulated shopping experience, where subjects have
to choose to buy a variety of goods over time, each with its own rate of inflation. Af-
ter shopping, subjects are asked their perceptions of the ‘economy-wide’ inflation rate
during the experiment, as well as the rates of each individual good. In calculating
the economy-wide rate, a well calibrated individual should take a weighted average
of individual-good rates, weighing each by the fraction of their total expenditures spent
on that good. Actual economy-wide inflation reports are clearly biased toward their re-
ported rates of the more frequently purchased goods. Their individual-good reports are
also more similar than the true rates. In a follow-up experiment, subjects who are told
4For example, perceptions tend to be higher for young people, women, unmarried individuals, minori-
ties, and lower-income individuals. Similar patterns have also been documented in the U.S. (Bryan and
Venkatu, 2001b), England (Blanchflower and MacCoille, 2009), Ireland (Duffy and Lunn, 2009) and New
Zealand (Leung, 2009).
5Recent attempts have been made to correct for the upward bias introduced by substitution effect and
quality improvement in the official CPI. Comparing the perceived inflation with chain-weighted hedo-
nic CPI inflation would result in larger gap, as the improved CPI inflation is typically lower than the
unadjusted CPI inflation.
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the true inflation rates of the individual goods still exhibit the frequency bias, indicating
that the frequency bias does not stem from misperceptions of individual-good rates, but
occurs only when aggregating those rates.
In our experiment, information sets are both observable and manipulable by the re-
searcher. Subjects’ beliefs are elicited in an incentive-compatible way. The basket of
purchased goods is chosen in advance and perfectly observed. The purchased goods are
fictitious and therefore not subject to quality variations. This level of control allows us
to eliminate confounds and isolate biases. The limitation of the laboratory is in the gen-
eralizability of results, given the level of abstraction and the self-selected subject pool.
But our findings are consistent with previous empirical work, and with our own analysis
of survey data on inflation perceptions (Section V). This suggests that the bias observed
in the laboratory may well be present in real-world perceptions in the field.
We are not the first to propose that inflation perceptions may exhibit the frequency
bias. For example, excessively high perceptions of inflation after the Euro cash changeover
have been attributed to the fact that frequently-purchased goods happened to be in-
flating faster during that time period (Del Giovane and Sabbatini, 2008, e.g.). Bates
and Gabor (1986) suggest that perceptions of inflation are altered by the availability
of price change information in a person’s memory.6 Del Missier et al. (2008) show that
inflation perceptions can be increased by priming subjects to think first about highly-
inflating goods. Ranyard et al. (2008) argue that availability should be greater for more
frequently-purchased goods. Thus, availability provides an established psychological
foundation for the frequency bias.
Inspired by these arguments, and by the loss aversion aspect of prospect theory (Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979), Brachinger (2008) constructs an Index of Perceived Inflation
(IPI) that uses frequency-based weights on individual goods (instead of expenditure-
based weights), and an asymmetric perception of price increases versus decreases. Junger-
mann et al. (2007) provide empirical support for these assumptions using a novel survey
on inflation perceptions and frequencies of purchase.7
A number of other factors have been identified that influence perceptions of inflation.
These include socio-economic status, education level, personal income levels and income
6Tversky and Kahneman (1973) first formalized availability as influencing perceptions of lotteries, but
the extension to price changes is transparent.
7Jungermann et al. (2007) find that absolute levels of perceived inflation correlate with purchase frequen-
cies (which are self-reported on a three-point scale), but they do not correlate errors in perceived rates
with the rates of frequently-purchased goods. Their findings would not represent a bias if frequently-
purchased goods in fact had higher inflation during the survey period.
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growth rates, personal experience with prices, social amplification by media, past expec-
tations of current-period inflation, nationality, and the time horizon in question. A sep-
arate strand of research focuses on the formation of reference prices, where new prices
are evaluated against past reference points. See Ranyard et al. (2008) and Mazumdar
et al. (2005) for surveys of these respective literatures.
To our knowledge, the correlation bias in individual-good perceptions has not been
documented, because almost all studies of inflation focus only on the economy-wide rate.
But in other domains it is well documented that subjects employ a similarity heuristic,
assessing independent objects as more similar than warranted. It may also be a rea-
sonable heuristic in this setting because, in practice, inflation rates of individual goods
often do exhibit correlation.
The closest work to ours is that of Huber (2011), who shows subjects cards with
prices of various goods and asks them to guess the overall inflation rate with respect
to previously-shown reference prices. As in our experiment, subjects report higher in-
flation when frequently-seen goods are inflating faster, documenting a frequency bias
in that task. Huber also observed surprisingly accurate inflation reports for individual
goods and, therefore, no correlation bias. This is likely because Huber’s subjects were
trained in performing inflation calculations at the start of the experiment and only had
to compare observed prices against a known reference price. Our subjects, in contrast,
faced a long stream of adjusting prices and were not trained in inflation calculations.8
Thus, we view Huber’s result as similar to our finding that the frequency bias persists
when individual-good inflation rates are known, but is less informative about settings
where biases in individual-good rates are also present.
A handful of experimental studies investigate the formation of expectations of future
prices (e.g. Schmalensee, 1976; Garner, 1982; Camerer, 1992; Hey, 1994). In these
contexts, the rational expectations hypothesis is generally rejected in favor of adap-
tive expectations models. Adam (2007) studies forecasts of future inflation rates in
a simulated macroeconomic model and finds that subjects adopt a ‘Restricted Percep-
tions Equilibrium’ in which agents use simple forecast functions only and outcomes and
beliefs reinforce each other. Pfajfar and Zakelj (2009) find that, within a New Key-
nesian sticky price framework, subjects use various models of expectations formation
of inflation, including sticky information, adaptive learning and rational rules. Burke
and Manz (2011) study how economic literacy affects inflation expectations formation
8Huber also did not study price recall, and did not elicit reports in an incentive-compatible way.
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through two specific channels: the choice of information and the use of given informa-
tion. Malmendier and Nagel (2012) propose a personal experience-based model of ex-
pectations formation. Using cross-sectional survey data, they find differences in expec-
tations across age groups can be explained by the variations in their life-time inflation
experiences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We formally define the frequency bias in
Section II. In Section III we describe the experimental design and present the various
results from the laboratory. In Section V, we relate our findings in the lab to survey
observations. Section VI concludes.
II THE FREQUENCY BIAS DEFINED
Economy-wide inflation rates are generally calculated as the rate of change in the total
price of a representative basket of goods. Formally, if each good i’s price at some point
in time t is given by pit, and if a basket is comprised of q i units of each good i, then the
period-t price of the basket is given by
(1) Pt =
∑
i
q ipit.
The inflation rate from period t−1 to t for each good is given by piit = (pit− pi,t−1)/pi,t−1,
and the economy-wide inflation rate is Πt = (Pt−Pt−1)/Pt−1. A bit of algebra shows that
the aggregate inflation rate must be a convex combination of individual-good inflation
rates, with the weight on each good equal to its share of the total expenditure in period
t−1. Formally, we have
(2) Πt =
∑
i
θi,t−1piit,
where
(3) θi,t−1 =
q ipi,t−1∑
j q jp j,t−1
.
We refer to θit as the expenditure weight for good i at time t. For our experiments θit
does not vary with time, so we typically ignore the t subscript in the notation.
In reality, consumers may have perceptions of inflation for each good i, denoted pi
p
i
,
that differ from the true good-i inflation rate pii. Their perception of the economy-wide
inflation rate (Πp) may also differ from the true economy-wide rate (Π). We can relate
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these perceived rates by
(4) Πp =
∑
i
ωipi
p
i
,
where ωi is the weight the consumer actually places on pi
p
i
. Regardless of the accuracy
of each pi
p
i
, if a consumer understands that economy-wide inflation rates are calculated
by constructing a basket of q i units of each good i, then it must be that ωi = θi for each
i.9
A frequency bias occurs when the consumer’s actual weights ωi deviate from θi, with
more weight put on goods that are more frequently purchased, and less weight put on
goods that are less frequently purchased. To separate frequency of purchase from quan-
tity purchased, we let q i = n iµi, where n i is the number of times good i was purchased
in the given time period (measured as the number of distinct transactions), and µi is the
average quantity per purchase. The frequency weight of good i is given by
(5) φi =
n i∑
j n j
From these weights we can formally define the frequency bias:
Definition. A consumer’s perceptions of inflation exhibit the frequency bias if there
is some α> 0 such that, for each good i,
(6) ωi =αφi+ (1−α)θi,
where φi = n i/
∑
j n j is the relative frequency with which good i is purchased and θi =
Pi/P is the fraction of total expenditures spent on good i.
The degree to which consumers use frequency weights versus expenditure weights is
captured by the parameter α. An unbiased consumer has α= 0. Given α, the perception
of the overall inflation rate is calculated as
Π
p
=
∑
i
ωipi
p
i
=
∑
i
[
αφi+ (1−α)θi
]
pi
p
i
.
9If the consumer knows that a basket is used to calculate inflation rates, but they do not know the quanti-
ties qi , then it still must be true that ωi ∈ [0,1] for each i and
∑
iωi = 1. In our experiment the quantities
qi are clearly shown.
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Letting Π
p
EXP
=
∑
i θipi
p
i
be the correct expenditure-weighted inflation rate and Π
p
FREQ
=∑
iφipi
p
i
be the frequency-based inflation rate, we have that
(7) Πp =αΠ
p
FREQ
+ (1−α)Π
p
EXP
.
Thus, the frequency bias can equivalently be expressed as a bias in Πp toward Π
p
FREQ
.10
Again, the parameter α provides a simple way to measure the magnitude of the bias.
It is this parameter that we measure in our controlled laboratory experiments.
The frequency bias represents an error in how individuals aggregate the inflation
rates within their own consumption basket. The bias will be observed at an aggregate
level (aggregating across individuals) as long as most individuals have similar relative
frequencies of purchasing various goods.
III THE LABORATORY EXPERIMENT
Experimental Design
The experiment is designed to measure perceived inflation rates in a simulated economy.
The frequency bias can be estimated by comparing reported perceptions of economy-
wide inflation against the reported perceptions of inflation for each individual good. If
the frequency bias is strong, then economy-wide inflation reports will be biased toward
the inflation rates of goods that are purchased more frequently; therefore, we compare a
baseline treatment with fairly flat inflation (Treatment EQ) to two treatments where the
most-frequently purchased goods inflation rates are either large and positive (Treatment
POS) or large and negative (Treatment NEG).
Nine experimental sessions were conducted at Ohio State University in November
and December of 2009.11 All subjects were Ohio State undergraduate students recruited
via e-mail.12 All sessions took place in the Ohio State Experimental Economics Labo-
ratory. In total, 186 subjects participated in the experiment in sessions of roughly 21
subjects per session. Each subject was only allowed to participate in one session of this
experiment.
10The Index of Perceived Inflation (IPI) developed by Brachinger (2008) is similar to Π
p
FREQ
, except all
individual-good rates are multiplied by c= 2 if they are positive to account for loss aversion.
11One small pilot session and one session with a technical flaw are excluded. Results from these sessions
appear qualitatively similar to the nine reported sessions. The data are available upon request.
12Existing evidence shows that undergraduate students behave similarly to other populations in most
economic decisions; there are some settings with systematic subject-pool differences, though there seems
to be little guidance about which settings will generate differences and in which directions these differ-
ences will operate. Thus, from an ex-ante perspective, subject pool effects can be treated as unbiased
noise. See Fréchette (2009) for details.
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For each session, all subjects arrived at the laboratory simultaneously, were seated at
computer terminals, and told to log into the experiment website.13 The website then pro-
vided specific instructions regarding the procedures for the experiment, which subjects
read at their own pace. They then proceeded to make a series of decisions through the
experiment website. Once every subject had completed the experiment, each was paid
in cash privately based on their earnings and left the laboratory. Earnings during the
experiment were recorded in ‘points’, with each point being worth one penny of actual
payout. Final earnings ranged from $8.40 to $22.59, with a mean of $18.15. Sessions
took roughly one hour to complete.
The experiment consists of two phases. The first phase is broken into 96 periods,
referred to as ‘days’. Sixteen days constitute a ‘month’, for a total of six months in the
first phase. In each day subjects are shown a 4×3 table of prices. An example table is
shown in Figure I. Each row corresponds to a different type of good, labeled abstractly
as goods A, B, C, and D, and each column corresponds to a different brand, labeled as 1,
2, and 3. Each day subjects are told which type of good they are to purchase (A, B, C,
or D) and are asked to select the cheapest price for that good. They could then click on
any of the twelve prices in the table. If they click on the lowest price of the correct good
then they earn five points. The middle price of the correct good earns them three points,
and the highest price earns them one point. Clicking on any price of an incorrect good
earns them zero points. After clicking a price, the experiment proceeds to the next day,
where a new table of twelve prices is shown and subjects are again told which good to
buy. If a subject does not click any price within 30 seconds then they earn zero points
for that ‘day’ and the experiment automatically proceeds to the next day (no time limit
was imposed on the first day).
Over the 96 days, subjects shop for the different goods with different frequencies.
Specifically, in each 16-day month they are asked to buy good A seven times, good B six
times, good C two times, and good D one time; see Table I. We refer to each month’s
bundle of purchases as a ‘basket’. The ordering of the purchases in the basket was
randomized within each month.
The simulated shopping experience is designed to mimic key aspects of actual con-
sumer purchases. When shopping for an item, consumers focus only on a single type of
good, though other goods’ prices are available for perusal. Some items—such as gasoline
and food—are purchased more frequently than others. Multiple prices for the desired
13The website is available at http://healy.econ.ohio-state.edu/exp/shopping. To experience this
experiment and view the instructions, log in using session password ‘test’.
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FIGURE I. Phase I of the experiment: The shopping decision.
Good A B C D Basket
Purchases per month 7 6 2 1 16
Month 1 mean price $1 $7 $122 $470 $763
Monthly inflation rate:
Treatment EQ 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Treatment POS 10% 9% 7% 1% 3.63%
Treatment NEG -10% -2% 1.5% 5.5% 3.80%
TABLE I. Frequencies of purchase, starting prices, and inflation rates for
the four goods used in the experiment.
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good may be offered, adding noise to inflation perceptions, and consumers benefit by
choosing the lowest-priced option. No notion of quality is introduced so that prices need
not be adjusted for varying quality levels. We reward purchases using a fixed point sys-
tem rather than giving shoppers a total budget because recalling basket inflation rates
with a fixed budget would amount to observing the total change in the budget. This
would oversimplify the problem of recalling inflation rates since, in reality, liquid asset
balances are affected by much more than expenditures.
Each of the four goods i ∈ {A,B,C,D} is given an initial mean price p¯i1 for the first
month; the values of p¯i1 used in the experiment are given in the third row of Table I.
At the beginning of each subsequent month, the mean price for each good jumps by the
monthly inflation rate pi∗
i
, which does not vary during the experiment. It then stays
constant through the month. In Treatment EQ (Sessions 1–3) all four goods have an
equal inflation rate pi∗i = 0.04. In Treatment POS (Sessions 4–6), the inflation rates
are positively correlated with the frequency of purchase, so that the more frequently-
purchased goods have higher inflation rates. In Treatment NEG (Sessions 7–9) the
inflation rates are negatively correlated with frequency of purchase, with goods A and B
actually experiencing deflation on average.
Although inflation occurs from month to month, the mean price does not change
within the month. Thus, for any day t in month m the mean price of good i is p¯im,
and in every day of month m+1 the mean price of good i is p¯i,m+1 = p¯im
(
1+pi∗
i
)
.
The three daily prices for each good offered to the subject each day are uniform ran-
dom draws centered at the current month’s mean price. Specifically, in each day t of
month m the realized price of brand b ∈ {1,2,3} is a value pibmt drawn from a uniform
distribution over the interval [0.9 p¯im, 1.1 p¯im], and then rounded to the nearest penny.
Each brand’s daily price is drawn independently of all other prices, conditional on that
good’s mean price for the month. All twelve prices (three brands of four goods) for each
day are shown in a single table so subjects can easily see all prices for all goods each day.
See Figure I for an example of the actual table presented to subjects in the experiment.
If ι (m, t) ∈ {1,2,3,4} identifies the good a subject is asked to buy on day t of month m,
and if pimt =min{pi1mt, pi2mt, pi3mt} denotes the minimum price for good i on day t of
month m, then the total expenditure on good i in month m is given by
Pim =
∑
{t:ι(m,t)=i}
pimt.
The realized total basket price for month m is then the total expenditure for the month,
Pm =
∑
iPim.
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The realized inflation rate for the entire basket of goods over the six months is given
by Π = (P6−P1) /P1. The realized inflation rate for each good i over the six months
is the change in total expenditures on good i between the first and last month, or
pii = (Pi6−Pi1) /Pi1 . Here, the realized inflation rates pii may differ slightly from the
fixed, underlying inflation rates pi∗i given in Table I because of randomness in the actual
price draws observed by a subject. Note that all inflation rates are calculated based on
subjects’ actual purchases, and not on prices they did not pay.
As described in Section II, the basket inflation rate must be a convex combination of
individual inflation rates, using the expenditure shares as weights. Thus, if θi = Pi1/P1
is the expenditure weight of each good i, then
(8) Π=
∑
i
θipii.
Phase one of the experiment ends after all six months of shopping were complete,
which typically takes about twenty minutes. At no point during the first phase are
subjects told that they are buying an identical basket of goods each month—though an
astute subject could deduce this fact—and subjects are never told in phase one that they
will be asked inflation-related questions in phase two.
Phase two consists of two decisions made sequentially: A guess of the basket inflation
rate and a guess of each good’s inflation rate.
Before the first decision, subjects are told that they had just purchased an identical
quantity of each good in each month, thus forming a ‘basket’ of goods that they had
purchased in each month. They are then asked: “What was the TOTAL percentage
change of the price of a basket of goods from month 1 to month 6?” Subjects then enter a
guess of the six-month basket inflation rate, which we denote here byΠp.14 At the end of
the experiment they are told the realized inflation rate Π and receive 425−500 |Πp−Π|
points for their guess. Thus, a perfect guess earns $4.25, while a guess that is off by ten
percentage points (where |Πp−Π| = 0.10) earns $3.75. Earnings are truncated below
zero, so no subject can earn negative payoffs for this decision. Subjects do not learn the
true inflation rate or their earnings for this guess until the experiment is complete.
After submitting their estimate of the basket inflation rate, subjects are asked to
guess the six-month inflation rate for each of the four goods. At the end of the exper-
iment, the subject is paid 125− 500
∣∣pip
i
−pii
∣∣ points for each of their four guesses pip
i
.
Thus, four perfect guesses earns $5.00, and subjects lose five cents for every percentage
14Before continuing, subjects are asked to verify all decisions that require keyboard input in order to
minimize the occurrence of typographic errors.
12 GEORGANAS, HEALY AND LI
Theoretical Estimated 95% Confidence
Weights Weights Interval
Frequency-Based Inflation Rate 0.000 0.440 [0.241,0.639]
Expenditure-Based Inflation Rate 1.000 0.560 [0.361,0.759]
TABLE II. Estimate of the size of the frequency bias in reported inflation rates.
point difference between a guess and that good’s true inflation rate. Again, earnings
were truncated below zero, so no subject could earn negative payoffs for this decision.
Subjects do not learn the true inflation rate or their earnings for this guess until the
experiment was completed.
At the end of the experiment subjects are shown their earnings in points from each
decision in the experiment, along with the true inflation rates for each good and for the
entire basket of goods. The point earnings are then converted to dollars (at a rate of one
cent per point) and rounded up to the next whole dollar amount. Subjects are paid their
earnings in cash privately, sign a receipt, and leave the laboratory individually.
In our analysis, eight subjects (out of 186) are removed from the data as outliers for
having at least one guess whose error was greater than 100 percentage points.15
Measuring the Frequency Bias
We begin by measuring the degree of frequency bias across all treatments. This is done
by estimating the parameter α in the relationship
Π
p
=αΠ
p
FREQ
+ (1−α)Π
p
EXP
that was derived in equation (7) above. The values Π
p
EXP
and Π
p
FREQ
are calculated from
the individual-good inflation reports for each subject. The announced basket rates (Πp)
are then regressed on these two values. We constrain the two regression coefficients to
sum to one, though we do not require that α be between zero and one. The results are
shown in Table II.
On average, subjects put 44% weight on the frequency with which goods are pur-
chased and only 56% weight on the (theoretically-correct) expenditure weights. These
estimates have a standard error of 0.101 and are therefore significantly different from
the theoretical predictions at the five percent level. Thus, the frequency bias is both
statically significant and economically meaningful in size.
15Various analyses that include outliers are reported in footnotes; further details are available upon
request.
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This result is robust to the specification of the linear regression. Removing the con-
straint that the coefficients sum to one gives an estimated relationship of
Π
p
= 0.428Π
p
FREQ
+0.528Π
p
EXP
with a standard errors of 0.102 and 0.109, respectively. Also allowing for a constant
gives an estimated relationship of
Π
p
= 8.187+0.419Π
p
FREQ
+0.257Π
p
EXP
with standard errors of 1.905, 0.975, and 0.121, respectively. The positive constant
indicates a general tendency to report basket rates that are high relative to the reported
individual-good rates, and both slope estimates remain significantly different from both
zero and one.16
Breaking the result down by treatment yields somewhat noisier results because the
sample sizes are smaller. In Treatment POS the estimated α (the weight on Π
p
FREQ
) is
0.387, with a p-value of 0.002. In Treatment NEG the estimated α is 0.291 with an
insignificant p-value of 0.124. In Treatment EQ α is not identified because ΠFREQ =
Π
EXP.
Treatment Differences
Figure II presents the difference between actual and reported inflation for each treat-
ment. It shows that people overestimate basket inflation rates when the frequently-
purchased goods have the highest inflation rates (Treatment POS), and that people un-
derestimate overall inflation rates when the frequently-purchased goods have the lowest
inflation rates (Treatment NEG). When all goods have the same inflation rate, subjects
are reasonably well calibrated (Treatment EQ).17
Table III shows the average reported and actual inflation rates in each treatment for
each individual good and for the total basket, as well as the average error for each. The
treatment effects from Figure II are apparent in the last column of the table; reported
rates for the basket are too high in Treatment POS, roughly accurate in the Treatment
16Because Π
p
EXP
and Π
p
FREQ
have an estimated correlation coefficient of 0.723, one might worry that these
regressions are impacted by multicollinearity problems. Diagnostic tests show that multicollinearity is
not a serious problem here: The variance inflation factor of the last regression is 2.09 and the tolerance of
α is is 0.478. Both are below most thresholds for concern. Finally, regressing Πp on Π
p
FREQ
alone gives an
estimated relationship of Πp = 10.286+0.568Π
p
FREQ
with standard errors of 1.644 and 0.068, respectively.
17If outliers are included, the median errors in basket guesses for POS, EQ, and NEG are 3.02, −1.67, and
−7.46, respectively. The 95% confidence intervals for these three values (using a binomial approximation)
are [−2.52,11.76], [−4.23,3.30], and [−11.64,0.04].
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FIGURE II. Average errors (in percentage points) in economy-wide infla-
tion perceptions by treatment. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence
intervals.
Good
Trt A B C D Basket
Purchases/Period 7 6 2 1
POS
Reported Inflation 29.30 23.70 22.90 22.49 25.47
Actual Inflation 61.02 53.24 40.42 5.16 19.57
Average Error -31.72* -29.54* -17.52* 17.33* 5.90*
EQ
Reported Inflation 19.87 19.19 19.88 19.17 23.01
Actual Inflation 21.96 21.46 21.08 21.27 21.16
Average Error -2.09 -2.27 -1.21 -2.10 1.86
NEG
Reported Inflation -2.08 7.57 8.62 12.62 10.47
Actual Inflation -40.99 -9.75 8.28 30.33 20.37
Average Error 38.91* 17.32* 0.34 -17.71* -9.90*
Note: *Average error is significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
TABLE III. Mean six-period inflation rates for each good and for the en-
tire basket.
FREQUENCY BIAS IN PERCEPTIONS OF INFLATION 15
FIGURE III. Histograms of the difference between the maximum and
minimum of individual good inflation rates, reported and actual.
EQ, and too low in Treatment NEG. The average errors (reported rates minus true rates)
are significantly different from zero (at the 5% level) in Treatments POS and NEG,
but not in EQ. Errors in Treatment NEG are significantly lower than in the other two
treatments (large-sample permutation test p-values of < 0.001 and 0.001, respectively),
though errors in Treatments POS and EQ are not significantly different (p-value of
0.157).18
Individual-Good Inflation Rates
The frequency bias is one of aggregation. Table III also reveals a systematic bias in
the accuracy of individual-good inflation rates: Subjects report individual-good inflation
rates that are biased toward the overall basket rate. For example, in Treatment POS,
subjects grossly underestimate the rate of the highest-inflation goods and overestimate
the rate of the lowest-inflation goods. In Treatment NEG the same phenomenon oc-
curs. In Treatment EQ, however, each individual good’s inflation rate equals the basket
rate, and so subjects’ individual-good reports are well calibrated. Figure III shows that,
for Treatments POS and NEG, the range of reported individual-good rates is generally
smaller than the true range. In fact, 94% of these subjects report a smaller range than
18See Siegel and Castellan, 1988, p.154 for a description of this test. Including outliers and using a
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, the p-values of these three comparisons are < 0.001 for POS=NEG, 0.023 for
EQ=NEG, and 0.109 for POS=EQ.
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the range they actually experienced. Eight of these subjects (6.8%) report the exact
same rate for all four goods.
We refer to this bias in the accuracy of individual good reports as the correlation bias,
since reported individual-good rates are more correlated than the true individual-good
rates.19 In all three treatments, the actual prices are independently drawn for each good,
and so no correlation exists between the true inflation rates of the four goods.20 Subjects’
reports, however, are highly correlated. For every treatment and for every pair of goods,
the subjects’ reported inflation rates for those two goods have a positive correlation co-
efficient that is significant at the five-percent level. The estimated coefficients are all
greater than thirty percent. Figure IV shows the relationship between actual inflation
rates and reported rates for the four goods. A linear regression shows a relationship of
0.27 with a standard error 0.025, significantly less than the one-to-one relationship that
would be exhibited by a well-calibrated individual.
It is possible that the correlation bias is driving the treatment differences observed
in Figure II. Suppose subjects exhibit the correlation bias but not the frequency bias,
so that their individual-good rates are correlated but, given those incorrect rates, they
form their perceptions of the basket rate using the (correct) expenditure weights on each
good. In Treatment POS, the infrequently-purchased Goods C and D have the lower
inflation rates, so such a subject would overestimate those rates. But those goods also
constitute 93 percent of total expenditures, so these two overestimates would result in
an overestimation of the basket rate. Similarly, in Treatment NEG, Goods C and D have
high inflation rates and would be underestimated, leading to an underestimated basket
rate. In Treatment EQ all goods’ rates would be correctly perceived, as would the basket
rate. These predictions exactly match Figure II.
To disentangle the correlation bias from the frequency bias, we regress basket infla-
tion reports on individual-good inflation reports to estimate the weights subjects place
on each good. These estimates can then be compared to the (average) expenditure-
based weights that subjects would use if they exhibit no frequency bias, as well as the
frequency-based weights for each good. The results appear in the first panel of Table IV.
19A simple explanation for the correlation bias is that subjects have a prior over inflation rates that is
common across goods and correct when averaging across goods. This is particularly justifiable in a context-
free laboratory experiment with fictitious goods. If subjects observe the true inflation rate with noise
(perhaps due to inattention) then, assuming the distributions of the prior and noise are symmetric and
quasiconcave (see Chambers and Healy, 2012), the average posterior expectation of each good’s inflation
rate will lie between its true rate and the common prior. Perceived inflation rates will be biased toward
the overall mean, generating the correlation bias.
20Pairwise tests for correlation confirm this expected result in our data.
FREQUENCY BIAS IN PERCEPTIONS OF INFLATION 17
−50% 0% 50% 100%
−50%
0%
50%
100%
Actual Individual−Good Inflation
R
ep
or
te
d 
In
di
vid
ua
l−
G
oo
d 
In
fla
tio
n
 
 
FIGURE IV. Reported versus actual inflation rates across the four indi-
vidual goods.
I. Reported Individual Inflation in Good:
A B C D
Reported Basket Inflation 0.214 0.234 0.102 0.450
(Standard Error) (0.075) (0.121) (0.119) (0.088)
II. Loss Aversion-Adjusted Reported Rates:
A B C D
Reported Basket Inflation 0.119 0.329 0.210 0.342
(Standard Error) (0.071) (0.108) (0.106) (0.081)
Avg. Expenditure Weights 0.009 0.055 0.319 0.616
Frequency Weights 0.438 0.375 0.125 0.063
TABLE IV. Estimates for reported basket inflation regressed on reported
individual-good inflation rates, compared to the expenditure-based and
frequency-based weights.
Indeed, subjects’ actual weights exhibit a significant frequency bias for Goods A, C
and D (one-sided p-values of 0.004, 0.035, and 0.032, respectively), with a marginally
significant frequency bias in the weight on Good B (p-value 0.071). Thus, we find that
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both the frequency bias and the correlation bias operate simultaneously, and both work
together to generate the treatment effects seen in Figure II.
We can also estimate the weights in Brachinger’s (2008) Inflation Perceptions Index
(IPI), in which agents use only fequency weights (α = 1) and positive individual-good
inflation rates are doubled because of loss aversion.21 The second panel of Table IV
displays estimates from this regression specification. The frequency bias is significant
in goods B andD (p-values 0.006 and< 0.001) but not in goods A and C (0.061 and 0.152).
The root mean squared error of the second regression is noticeably larger than the first
(28.389 versus 16.884), indicating that the inclusion of loss aversion does not provide a
better estimate for subjects’ inflation weights. Furthermore, Brachinger’s assumption of
α= 1 appears too extreme for our data.
IV A FOLLOW-UP EXPERIMENT
The shopping phase of our main experiment is designed to be as simple as possible.
Subjects are explicitly told which good to buy each day. The actual price levels do not
affect earnings, and subjects are not told that they will be asked to guess inflation rates,
so subjects have no incentive to pay close attention to price levels while shopping. This
may exacerbate inflation perception errors, and perhaps introduce systematic biases.
To examine the robustness of our main results, we ran a second experiment in which
subjects are given a monthly shopping budget and can choose which good to buy each
day based on their prices. They are paid for any unspent budget, and therefore have
a strong incentive to watch prices and buy each good when a relatively low price is
offered.22 Their only constraint is that they must buy a total of seven units of Good
A, six units of Good B, two units of Good C, and one unit of Good D each month. See
Figure V for a screenshot of this shopping interface.23 In a debriefing survey, many
subjects indicated that their strategy was to focus on the prices of the most expensive
good, buying it only when a low price appeared.
We also increased awareness of price levels and inflation by initially informing sub-
jects that, after shopping, they “will be presented with several questions about [their]
21More specifically, Brachinger (2008) proposes the IPI as (using our notation) IPI t =∑
i:pi,t>pi,0
[
c
(
pi,t−pi,0
pi,0
)
+1
]
φi,0 +
∑
i:pi,t<pi,0
pi,t
pi,0
φi,0, where c = 2 and reference prices pi,0 are set to
be the prices of the base period. Here, we take the month-1 price as the reference price.
22Subjects’ monthly budgets were randomly drawn from a uniform distribution on [0.95P¯,1.05P¯], where
P¯ = (
∑
m
∑
i p¯imqi)/6 is the average monthly expenditure if the subject always buys at the mean price.
23The computer interface prevents subjects from buying more than the required quantity of any good by
making the purchase buttons inactive for that good.
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FIGURE V. The shopping decision in the follow-up experiment.
shopping experience, prices, inflation, etc.” We did not explicitly tell them they would
be asked to guess inflation rates, however, because subjects could make perfect guesses
simply by writing down prices in months one and six. For similar reasons, we did not
show them their monthly shopping budgets or the amount remaining in those budgets
until the experiment ended.
Finally, we added two new questions to the end of the experiment, after guessing bas-
ket inflation rates and individual inflation rates. First, subjects are asked to guess the
average price they paid for each good in month one and month six.24 Then subjects are
shown the actual inflation rates for each good and asked once again to guess the basket
rate. This allows us to isolate the frequency bias by ‘shutting down’ the correlation bias.
For each guess, subjects received 125 points minus 5 points for each percentage point of
error, with a minimum payment of zero on every guess.
We ran two treatments, POS2 and NEG2, which are otherwise identical to treatments
POS and NEG described in Table I. A total of 43 subjects participated in POS2 and 47
in NEG2. Five subjects (two in in POS2 and three in NEG2) are discarded for having at
least one inflation guess with over 100 percentage points error. Price guesses with more
24For example, with Good A, they are asked the average of the six Good-A prices they chose in that month.
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Good
Trt A B C D Basket Basket (2nd)
Purchases/Period 7 6 2 1
POS2
Reported Inflation 37.74 35.05 22.77 18.27 27.01 30.89
Actual Inflation 60.73 52.45 38.16 4.76 18.60 18.60
Average Error -22.99* -17.40* -15.39* 13.51* 8.41 12.29*
NEG2
Reported Inflation -13.72 -1.68 8.99 22.15 19.23 13.99
Actual Inflation -40.97 -9.92 7.58 30.28 20.07 20.07
Average Error 27.25* 8.24* 1.41 -8.12* -0.84 -6.08
Note: *Average error is significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
TABLE V. Mean six-period inflation rates for each good and for the entire
basket in the follow-up experiment.
than 100% error, or that are closer to another good’s true price, are removed from our
analysis.25
With this new data, our estimate of the magnitude of the frequency bias is given by
the following regression:
Π
p
= 0.206Π
p
FREQ
+0.794Π
p
EXP
.
This estimated frequency bias of 20.6% is lower than the 44.0% seen in the main ex-
periment, but still significantly positive with a p-value of 0.009.26 When using subjects’
second guesses of the basket rate (where actual individual-good rates are shown), the
estimate increases to 25.3% and remains significant (p-value < 0.001).
Average inflation reports and errors for each treatment are shown in Table V. Re-
sults are similar to the original experiment (Table III), though initial basket errors are
greater in Treatment POS2 (8.41 compared to 5.90) and much smaller in NEG2 (−0.84
compared to −9.90). Because the sample size is small and the data are noisy, we cannot
reject the hypotheses that basket error rates are zero on average in each treatment. But
we can reject the hypothesis that they are equal across treatments (large-sample per-
mutation test p-value of 0.044).27 Individual-good reports are less extreme than actual
inflation rates, demonstrating that the correlation bias is still present. The ranges of
25This constitutes 8.2% of our data. Many of these appear to be subjects incorrectly recalling the correct
price for the wrong good. Price-guess outlier data are available in an online appendix. Earnings ranged
from $6.53 to $25.40, with an average of $16.72.
26The estimated α is 22.4% if coefficients are not constrained to sum to one, and 21.6% if, in addition, a
constant is added to the regression. Both remain significant at the one percent level.
27When including outliers and using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, the p-value increases to 0.146 and
significance is lost.
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Reported Individual Inflation in Good:
A B C D
1st Reported Basket Inflation 0.080 0.127 0.316 0.477
(Standard Error) (0.116) (0.139) (0.179) (0.128)
Actual Individual Inflation in Good:
A B C D
2nd Reported Basket Inflation -0.181 0.576 0.276 0.330
(Standard Error) (0.183) (0.446) (0.409) (0.142)
Avg. Expenditure Weights 0.009 0.056 0.325 0.611
Frequency Weights 0.438 0.375 0.125 0.063
TABLE VI. Estimates for basket inflation reports regressed on (re-
ported or actual) individual-good inflation rates, compared to the average
expenditure-based and frequency-based weights.
individual-good reports are again too small, with 7.3% of subjects reporting the same
rate for all four goods. When individual-good rates are shown to subjects, their guesses
of the basket rate actually become worse in both treatments. The error in POS2 is sig-
nificantly different from zero, and from the error in NEG2 (both p-values < 0.001).28
Thus, shutting down the correlation bias exacerbates subjects’ errors in aggregating the
inflation rates, in exactly the direction predicted by the frequency bias.
Regressing the (initial) reported basket rate on the individual-good rates (top third
of Table VI) again reveals point estimates between the expenditure weights and the
frequency weights. Estimated weights are negatively correlated with frequency of pur-
chase, indicating that estimates are based more heavily on expenditure shares than fre-
quency weights. With the smaller sample size, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
actual weights equal the expenditure weights, but we can reject the frequency weights
at the 5% level for goods A and D. These facts are consistent with our estimate of α
being relatively small. Once again, multiplying positive individual-good inflation rates
by c = 2 to account for loss aversion (Brachinger, 2008) only increases the regression’s
root mean squared error (to 27.811 from 18.126), indicating a worse fit.
The middle third of Table VI show a regression of subjects’ second guess of the basket
inflation rate on the true individual-good rates. The pattern of estimated weights is less
clear, and only the frequency weight for good A can be rejected at the 5% level.
28Including outliers, the Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value for the hypothesis POS2=NEG2 is < 0.001.
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Good
Month Trt. A B C D
1 POS2 0.95% 4.99% 12.30% −3.82%
NEG2 −10.72% −4.13% 7.92% 5.71%
p-value (0.009) (0.008) (0.284) (<0.001)
6 POS2 −1.70% −2.34% 5.56% 4.54%
NEG2 15.69% 3.34% 2.74% −0.61%
p-value (0.002) (0.006) (0.498) (0.005)
TABLE VII. Average percentage error in price guesses by treatment and
month. p-values from two-sided permutation tests for differences in
means shown in parentheses.
Average errors in average price guesses, expressed as a percentage of the true aver-
age price, are shown in Table VII.29 Surprisingly, the correlation bias appears in these
price guesses as well. If subjects recall only the overall average price for each good (av-
eraging across all months), and believe inflation rates to be similar, then for goods with
high inflation they will overestimate month-1 prices and underestimate month-6 prices.
For goods with low inflation they will underestimate month-1 prices and overestimate
month-6 prices. This is consistent with the data: One-sided large-sample permutation
tests confirm significant differences in price errors between treatments for goods A, B,
and D, in both month 1 and month 6. Again, this correlation bias can partially explain
the treatment effect in the first basket rate guess, because subjects are overestimating
price growth of the expensive goods (C and D) in treatment POS2, and underestimating
price growth of expensive goods in treatment NEG2.
Subjects who incorrectly recall prices should also have incorrect memories of expen-
diture shares. Thus, even if a subject is trying to use the correct expenditure-based
weights, their basket inflation estimates will appear systematically biased. For exam-
ple, in POS2, subjects overestimate prices of Good A and therefore should overestimate
the month-1 expenditure share of Good A. Since Good A has the highest inflation, second
basket guess errors would be positive, even if subjects have no frequency bias. And this
is exactly what we observe. In NEG2, however, subjects would overestimate the expen-
diture share of Good D, which now has the highest inflation rate, and so second basket
errors should again be positive. But we observe negative errors in NEG2, contradicting
29If outliers are included and Wilcoxon tests used, then the difference in Good B month-1 errors becomes
insignificant (p= 0.132), and the difference in Good C month-1 errors becomes significant (p< 0.001). All
other test results are unaffected by the inclusion of outliers.
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this theory. In other words, the apparent frequency bias cannot be explained away by
assuming erroneous expenditure shares based on recalled prices.
We conclude that the existence of a frequency bias appears robust to details of the
shopping experience, and whether subjects are aware that questions about inflation
will follow. The magnitude of the frequency bias, however, is diminished when prices
are more salient and subjects are more focused on inflation. There are two possible
ways that the frequency bias could have been ‘explained away’ by the correlation bias—
through biased recall of individual inflation rates, or through biased estimates of the
expenditure weights—but our new experimental results reject either possibility. Thus,
we conclude that the frequency bias is a persistent error in individuals’ perceptions of
basket inflation rates.
V SUGGESTIVE EVIDENCE FROM SURVEY DATA
Do biases observed in a hypothetical laboratory setting with college undergraduates
extend to real-world inflation perceptions? We briefly examine inflation perceptions sur-
vey data in search of evidence that the frequency bias is in fact present. First, it has
been well documented by surveys of European consumers’ perceptions of inflation that
general public throughout the EMU member countries perceived significantly higher
inflation in the years 2002–06 following the introduction of the euro (Figure VI).30 In
general, prices of goods were rounded up after the conversion from local currencies to
the euro. This meant that the prices of low-value but frequently-purchased goods in-
creased significantly (e.g. from 1.70 to 2 euro) while for more valuable but infrequently
shopped goods the increase was insignificant (e.g. from 980.70 to 981 euro). In terms of
total expenditure, this rounding effect was trivial; however, for individuals whose daily
purchases became noticeably more expensive, the perceived effect was large.31
In a monthly survey conducted in Ohio for a shorter time period (August 1998 to No-
vember 2001), consumers were asked how much they think prices rose over the past 12
months. The average reported rate was 6 percent, while the actual increase in CPI was
only 2.7 percent (Bryan and Venkatu, 2001b). But inflation rates for non-durable goods
have been systematically higher than inflation rates for durable goods over the past
twenty years, with the difference becoming large after 2002. Since non-durable goods
30In this survey, participants are asked “How do you think prices have developed in the last 12 months?”
and are given possible answers “risen a lot”, “risen moderately”, “risen slightly”, “stayed about the same”,
and “fallen”. The reported indicator is a linear combination of the frequency of responses given to each
answer.
31See Del Giovane and Sabbatini (2008), for example.
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FIGURE VI. Actual inflation vs. a qualitative indicator of perceived Infla-
tion in the Euro area
are purchased more frequently, the frequency bias correctly predicts that consumers’
perceptions of inflation over this time period are greater than the CPI inflation rate
calculated using expenditure-weight.
To expand on this argument, consider consumer experiences in the United States for
the last two decades. There have been notable increases in the prices of low-price, every-
day goods, e.g. food and beverage (3.1 percent), energy (4 percent), and transportation
(2.6 percent), and a much smaller rise or even decline in the prices of the relatively ex-
pensive consumer goods, e.g. apparel (0.58 percent), audio-visual devices (0.4 percent),
and information technology (-11.1 percent). The aggregate effect is a relatively low over-
all CPI inflation rate. Consumers more frequently experienced the goods with higher
inflation rates, however, leading to the apparent upward biases in inflation perceptions
and expectations.
Although this correlation is merely suggestive, it does support the claim that the fre-
quency bias observed in the labmay also impact inflation perceptions—and expectations—
in the macroeconomy, making it a policy-relevant phenomenon.32 A thorough investiga-
tion of the ‘frequency weighted’ price statistics using micro-data on inflation perception
32It is interesting to note that although we observe frequency bias in average consumers, professional
forecasters do not appear to exhibit any such bias. In fact, professional inflation forecasts are generally
accurate (Keane and Runkle, 1990, e.g.). However, consumers only occasionally pay attention to news re-
ports of inflation forecasts (Carroll, 2003). In most macro policy applications, what matters is consumers’
inflation perceptions. It is in the failure to predict the consumers’ responses that policymakers’ models
FREQUENCY BIAS IN PERCEPTIONS OF INFLATION 25
and shopping frequency of individual goods would be an interesting topic for future re-
search.
VI DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
We have shown that people misperceive inflation in a controlled lab experiment, bias-
ing their perceptions of economy-wide inflation toward the inflation rates of the more-
frequently purchased goods. One implication is that macroeconomic analysts should
consider adjusting for the frequency bias in inflation perceptions. In this sense, our pa-
per provides experimental evidence supporting a modified version of Brachinger’s (2008)
Index of Perceived Inflation, in which the frequency bias is weakened (α < 1) and loss
aversion is ignored (c= 1).
An open question is whether the frequency bias is attenuated with experience. Al-
though our experiment cannot address this question, we conjecture that adjustments
in perceptions would be very slow. Learning is fastest when feedback about mistakes is
clear (see Weber, 2003, e.g.). Small mistakes in consumption-savings decisions, however,
are unlikely to provide informative negative feedback. Thus, consumers will feel little
to no pressure to adapt their method of aggregation. The field evidence also suggests no
attenuation of the bias over time. We hypothesize that the accuracy of expert forecasts
(Keane and Runkle, 1990) does not come from recalling past shopping experiences, but
rather from considering prices and inflation analytically.
The frequency bias that was documented in the present study may also be present
in other situations where agents have to aggregate different pieces of relevant informa-
tion to form a perception of current trends. Investors in financial markets observe the
movement of individual prices in multiple occasions over a given time period. As far
as the frequency of price information they get about specific shares is not equal to the
weight they have in the general index, investors’ perceptions of the general trends in
the stock market could be biased. Another example can be found in the field of mass
media: Receivers of news will get the same news item multiple times, which might bias
their perception of reality. Such a phenomenon can be relevant in the field of political
economy. Suppose a given candidate has one good and one bad characteristic. Even
voters with neutral priors might underestimate the relative merits of this candidate if
may suffer in predictive power. It is for this reason that policymakers should care about the existence of
the frequency bias.
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they receive reminders about the negative characteristic more frequently than they re-
ceive reminders about the positive one. This justifies the extensive use of advertising in
political campaigns. An extensive study of such questions remains for future research.
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APPENDIX I: PRICE-GUESS OUTLIER DATA (FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION ONLY)
Month 1 Month 6
Trt. Subj.# A B C D A B C D
POS2 3 True $0.95 $6.55 $112.22 $459.67 $1.55 $9.92 $162.26 $463.48
Guess $0.95 $1.35 $160.00 $450.00 $1.85 $1.95 $170.00 $450.00
12 True $0.95 $6.51 $111.85 $426.60 $1.52 $10.06 $157.69 $451.86
Guess $1.00 $7.00 $480.00 $557.00 $1.85 $9.50 $460.00 $498.00
21 True $0.94 $6.47 $112.23 $427.09 $1.54 $9.86 $157.47 $448.42
Guess $0.98 $7.00 $315.00 $410.00 $1.55 $9.70 $350.00 $448.00
22 True $0.99 $6.65 $116.19 $470.04 $1.49 $10.00 $171.09 $447.25
Guess $4.00 $8.00 $121.00 $487.00 $6.00 $10.00 $136.00 $500.00
23 True $0.96 $6.50 $111.96 $447.47 $1.51 $10.24 $161.76 $459.15
Guess $233.00 $245.00 $259.00 $221.00 $276.00 $300.00 $300.00 $320.00
25 True $0.99 $6.86 $120.82 $460.05 $1.52 $10.18 $158.32 $501.94
Guess $8.40 $74.00 $140.00 $500.00 $11.20 $95.00 $180.00 $650.00
30 True $0.96 $6.78 $116.94 $432.84 $1.54 $10.07 $159.69 $473.69
Guess $0.99 $6.00 $8.54 $408.30 $1.30 $7.23 $10.63 $454.00
35 True $0.94 $6.64 $115.02 $436.29 $1.55 $10.34 $154.78 $452.09
Guess $1.34 $2.00 $130.00 $350.00 $1.60 $3.00 $148.00 $450.00
NEG2 45 True $0.95 $6.60 $111.39 $507.07 $0.56 $6.05 $142.72 $665.23
Guess $0.83 $15.00 $130.00 $500.00 $0.65 $18.00 $140.00 $590.00
46 True $0.95 $6.54 $113.84 $456.33 $0.54 $6.05 $129.89 $574.63
Guess $0.50 $5.50 $60.00 $250.00 $0.70 $7.00 $75.00 $590.00
54 True $0.95 $6.59 $114.47 $430.27 $0.55 $5.85 $118.64 $569.13
Guess $7.00 $42.00 $220.00 $420.00 $4.55 $37.00 $240.00 $560.00
57 True $0.96 $6.81 $110.12 $431.73 $0.55 $5.83 $126.94 $556.95
Guess $5.80 $6.50 $118.00 $525.00 $6.00 $6.70 $120.00 $535.00
63 True $0.97 $6.52 $114.52 $445.45 $0.55 $6.08 $121.09 $590.91
Guess $5.70 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $440.00
65 True $0.93 $6.52 $118.56 $429.01 $0.56 $5.91 $119.91 $561.61
Guess $0.86 $6.64 $117.50 $451.00 $62.00 $6.09 $124.50 $555.00
66 True $0.95 $6.69 $119.16 $423.86 $0.55 $5.98 $119.23 $557.22
Guess $4.50 $36.00 $138.00 $480.00 $4.20 $34.00 $120.00 $550.00
69 True $0.94 $6.70 $117.64 $435.14 $0.56 $5.95 $119.82 $585.02
Guess $1.00 $6.00 $21.00 $500.00 $1.00 $7.00 $28.00 $600.00
72 True $0.95 $6.43 $113.42 $444.19 $0.56 $6.01 $124.01 $621.07
Guess $80.00 $1.50 $120.00 $450.00 $60.00 $1.50 $140.00 $650.00
78 True $1.02 $6.84 $113.06 $430.26 $0.55 $5.92 $125.73 $581.50
Guess $0.81 $5.55 $200.25 $534.60 $0.89 $5.98 $252.35 $587.25
80 True $0.94 $6.63 $117.19 $435.95 $0.58 $6.10 $125.91 $562.83
Guess $70.00 $6.00 $110.00 $450.00 $70.00 $8.00 $130.00 $575.00
82 True $0.95 $6.66 $120.25 $451.19 $0.54 $5.89 $122.89 $568.75
Guess $1.19 $4.53 $17.11 $119.00 $0.68 $4.53 $11.00 $480.00
86 True $0.98 $6.57 $114.18 $431.22 $0.56 $6.12 $121.64 $632.02
Guess $0.58 $4.50 $200.00 $415.00 $0.68 $5.50 $300.00 $615.00
TABLE VIII. Boldfaced price guesses were removed for being closer to
another good’s true price. Italicized guesses were removed for havingmore
than 100% error. All other price-guess data were not removed.
